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Abstract: This paper examines the political economy forces that lead to the creation of the 
informal sector in an economy. Our analysis treats unofficial economy as an endogenous 
outcome that may be produced by the conflict for redistribution between different groups of 
agents. The crucial factor in our analysis is whether the extension of voting franchise takes 
place before the consolidation of a strong state characterized by solid institutions (this is what 
we call “early democratization”). When this happens, distributional conflict affects the quality 
of institutions since the political elites have an incentive to decide weaker institutions which 
allows them to mitigate the tax burden fallen on their income. In the empirical section, we 
examine whether countries that experienced “early democratization” are characterized by 
relatively larger informal sectors. Our findings provide strong empirical evidence in favor of 
the implication driven by our theoretical model. 
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1. Introduction 
A significant part of the economic activity, in both developing and developed 
countries, is taking place in the informal sector. Based on recent estimates of 
Schneider et al. (2010) informal economic activity –in most developing countries-
exceeds the 50% of the total economic activity.  The existence of a large informal 
sector generates several malfunctions in the operation of the markets as well as in the 
performance of the public sector. 
Starting from Rauch (1991), there is a highly influential theoretical and empirical 
literature examining in depth alternative determinants of informal activity. Giles and 
Tedds (2002), Cuff et al. (2011) and Cebula (1997) examine the effect of taxation on 
the size of the informal sector; Johnson et al. (1998), Fortin et al. (1997) and Straub 
(2005) focus on the effect of market regulation whereas Chong and Gradstein (2007), 
Dessy and Palage (2003) and Rosser et al. (2000) examine the impact of income 
inequality on informality. Finally, Friedman et al. (2000), Dabla-Norris et al. (2008), 
Dreher et al. (2009) focus on the institutional quality and examine how poor 
institutions (e.g. more bureaucracy, greater corruption, weak legal environment) are 
associated with a larger unofficial economy.  
On the other hand, another strand of the literature recognizes that the existence of 
informal economy affects the size and the scope of income redistribution between the 
rich and the poor (see e.g. Roine, 2006; Traxler, 2009; 2012; Matsaganis and 
Flevotomou, 2010). However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no paper 
combining these two parallel research agendas by treating the size of the informal 
economy as an endogenous outcome of distributional conflict between different 
groups of agents.1 Specifically, there is no study examining the political economy 
                                                 
1 The central finding of Roine, 2006 and Traxler, 2009 and 2012 is that in the presence of tax evasion, 
the tax system may be less redistributive than if everyone reported truthfully. Moreover if the tax 
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forces that produce incentives to generate a large unofficial economy in order to 
mitigate unfavourable redistribution of income from some groups to some others. 
The present paper seeks to place the spotlight on the potential political economy 
forces that lead to the creation of an informal sector. Our analysis treats unofficial 
economy as an endogenous outcome that may be produced –under certain political 
circumstances- by distributional conflict between different groups. The crucial factor 
in our analysis is whether the extension of voting franchise (to the poorer segment of 
the population) takes place before the consolidation of a strong state characterized by 
solid institutions. This is what we call “early democratization.”  
Our theoretical argument goes as follows. Extension of voting franchise increases 
the political power of the relatively poor share of the population and this unavoidably 
leads to increased demand for redistribution from high to low incomes (see e.g. 
Lindert, 1994; Aidt et al. 2006; Aidt and Jensen 2009). When this distributional 
conflict takes place before the consolidation of a firm institutional structure, the 
political elite have an incentive to establish low quality institutions which allows them 
to mitigate the tax burden fallen on their income.2 According to this rationale, lower 
institutional quality (and correspondingly larger unofficial economy), although it 
implies losses in terms of productivity, appears to be the optimal choice for some 
groups of agents as it mitigates the extent of unfavorable income redistribution.3  
                                                                                                                                            
evasion technology is such that the rich evade more than the poor, these models predict redistribution 
from the middle class towards both the poor and the rich. 
2 In contrast, in the presence of a strong state characterized by solid institutions the above theoretical 
argument does not hold and the distributional conflict results to larger public spending and changes of 
the tax structure in favor of the low income agents. Lindert (1994) estimates the impact of the franchise 
extension on the timing and the spread of social programs in Western Europe during the period 1880-
1930. Aidt et al. (2006) estimates the impact of the franchise extension on the scope of government 
spending in Western Europe during the period 1860-1938. Finally, Aidt and Jensen (2009) study the 
effect of the extension of the voting franchise on the size of government spending and the tax structure 
in ten Western European countries over the period 1860-1938. 
3 In this respect, our paper could be indirectly related with the approach that considers inefficient 
institutions to be the outcome of conflict between groups (see e.g.  Acemoglu and Robinson 2000a; 
2006 and Acemoglu, 2006). According to this view, the economic institutions are not always chosen by 
the whole society, but by the groups that control political power. These groups will choose the 
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In Section 2, we build a standard model where the formal sector coexists with 
an informal one as in Cuff et al. (2011). The proposed model has the following 
features. We consider an economy with two types of agents: low and high skilled 
workers. Each low skilled worker is endowed with a fixed amount of effective labor 
and decides whether he will supply it or not in the labor market. On the other hand, 
each high skilled worker is endowed with θj units of effective labor and decides to 
supply them either in the formal or the informal sector of the economy. Private agents 
maximize their utility by taking tax policies and the quality of institutions as given. 
Before any economic choice is made a national government chooses the tax rates on 
low skilled (tw) and on high skilled (te) workers optimally by treating the quality of 
institutions as given. Finally, before any economic and political choices a political 
elite decides the quality of the institutions (and the corresponding size of the informal 
sector) to maximize the utility of its own members.4 In doing so, it takes into account 
the outcomes of all the subsequent stages and the possible states of the world in the 
later stages of the game.  
Our theoretical results are as follows. When tax policies are chosen subject to 
universal suffrage there is a redistribution effect that leads to tax burden transfer from 
the rich to the poor. This redistribution effect appears to be decreasing in the quality 
of institutions. Therefore, when in the first stage of the game the political elite decides 
the quality of institutions finds it optimal to choose a relatively lower quality of 
institutions (and a corresponding larger informal sector) so as to mitigate the tax 
burden fallen on high skilled income. In contrast, when tax policies are chosen under 
restricted voting rights (i.e. the poor are excluded from voting), the redistribution 
                                                                                                                                            
economic institutions that maximize their own benefit, and the economic institutions that result may 
not coincide to those that maximize total income.  
4 Following the rationale of the relevant literature (see, for example, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000b; 
Lizzeri and Persico, 2004) in our model, we define the political elite to be those individuals with the 
highest income. 
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effect vanishes and the political elite decides the highest possible quality of 
institutions- i.e., the one that maximizes the productivity of the economy.  
In Section 3, we examine the empirical validity of our theoretical model. 
According to our analysis, countries that experienced “early democratization” (that is 
they proceeded to extensive voting franchise before the consolidation of a firm 
institutional framework) should be characterized by relatively larger informal sectors. 
In order to obtain a measure for the extent of the voting rights and the corresponding 
degree of political competition in the first years after the year of independence of a 
state, we construct two alternative variables. Namely, the “competitiveness of 
participation” (i) in the first five years and (ii) in the first ten years after the year of 
independence.  
Then we proceed to the estimation of an empirical model where the dependent 
variable is the shadow economy measure developed by Schneider et al. (2010) and 
key explanatory variables are the “early democratization” measures described before. 
After several sensitivity analyses across a number of different specifications, our 
empirical findings suggest that the relationship between “early democratization” and 
the size of informal economy is indeed positive and statistically significant, thus 
confirming our theoretical proposition.  
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2. The Model 
2.1 The economy and sub-game equilibrium 
Consider an economy populated by two types of agents: low skilled 
(unskilled) workers (a share b of the total population) and high skilled (skilled) 
workers (a share 1-b of the total population). Each unskilled worker is endowed with 
fixed units of effective labor (w) and decides whether he will supply it or not in the 
labor market. On the other hand, each high- skilled worker j is endowed with θj units 
of effective labor and decides whether he will supply them to the formal or the 
informal sector of the economy. We assume that the economy produces a single 
homogeneous good under a constant marginal product technology, where one unit of 
effective labor is transformed to one unit of output. The labor market works in a 
competitive way, and thus labor earns its marginal product, i.e. the return to each unit 
of effective labor is 1.  
The national government sets a unit tax tw on low skilled and te on high skilled 
workers in order to finance the provision of a public good- g. The way government 
choices are made is determined by the (exogenously determined) political regime 
type. We assume that there are two alternative political regimes: democracy, where 
government choices are made through universal voting and oligarchy, where 
government choices are made by a subset of the population- the elite. In the latter case 
we assume that the elite include those high-skilled workers with units of effective 
labor, and consequently income, above a threshold level 'θ  (i.e., the richest part of 
the population).  
However before any economic and political choices are made, the institutional 
setting of the economy must be determined. We assume that this is determined by the 
wishes of the elite. 
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The sequence of events is as follows. First, the political elite decides once-and-
for-all the quality of the institutions. In turn, the national government chooses the tax 
policy in order to finance the provision of the transfers by taking the quality of the 
institutions as given. Finally, private agents make their own decisions. Namely, each 
low skilled workers decides whether he will provide his effective labor or not and 
each high- skilled workers decides whether he will be employed in the formal or the 
informal sector of the economy. 
 We will solve the game backwards. Thus, we first solve the last stage. Private 
agents maximize their utility by taking tax policies and the quality of institutions as 
given. The solution to this stage will give the sub-game equilibrium which is for any 
feasible tax policy and institutional quality.  
In the second stage, we solve for national tax policy. Namely, the national 
government chooses the tax rates on workers (tw) and on entrepreneurs (te) optimally 
by taking into account the sub-game equilibrium and by treating the quality of 
institutions as given. The government choice depends on the political regime; with an 
exogenous probability σ, voting rights are assigned to the entire population (i.e. fully 
representative democracy) and tax policy is chosen so as to satisfy the majority of the 
population. On the other hand, with a probability 1-σ the regime will be oligarchic and 
tax policy is chosen so as to satisfy the preferences of the franchised political elite.5  
Finally, in the first stage the political elite choose the quality of the institutions 
to maximize the utility of its own members. In doing so, it takes into account the 
outcomes of all subsequent stages and the possible states of the world in the later 
stages of the game. The solution to this problem will give the equilibrium institutional 
quality.  
 
                                                 
5 In section 2.4 we also discuss the effects of making σ endogenous to the economic policy. 
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2.1.1 Low- skilled workers 
Each unskilled worker is endowed with one unit of labor which he can supply in 
the labor market and has the following utility function: 
 ( )wi w iu w t l gϕ= − − +  (1) 
where w is the effective units of labor of each unskilled worker, tw is the tax levied on 
workers, φi is the disutility of labor and l is a variable that equals to one if the worker 
chooses to participate in the labor market and equals to zero otherwise. With the 
assumed technology of production, w is also the income each low skilled worker. We 
assume that φi is distributed randomly across workers following a uniform distribution 
in the [0,1] range. Therefore, a worker i will choose to participate in the labor market 
if 0w iw t ϕ− − > . Then there is a cutoff level of φ, denoted byϕˆ , for which workers 
will be indifferent between working and not working, i.e. ˆ ww tϕ = − . Following the 
distribution assumptions about φi, total labor supply of low skilled workers is given 
by: 
 ( )
2s w
bL w t= −  (2) 
 
2.1.2 High skilled workers 
Each high skilled worker is endowed with θj units of labor. We assume that θj is 
uniformly distributed in the [1-ψ, 1+ψ] range, with 0<ψ<1, denoting the degree of 
income inequality among the skilled, with higher ψ implying greater inequality 
and1 wψ− ≥ . The latter assumption guarantees that skilled workers will always earn 
more than unskilled workers.6  
                                                 
6 Then the low skilled workers have always lower income that the high skilled, therefore in the rest of 
the paper we use the term poor and low- skilled interchangeably.    
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Skilled workers decide whether they will supply their labor in the formal or in 
the informal sector of the economy. A worker will supply its labor in the formal sector 
if he enjoys higher returns than in the informal sector. We assume that there is a direct 
benefit, in terms of productivity from being in the formal sector. This benefit is 
positively related to the quality of institutions, e. We conceive the benefit of better 
institutions to be due to better legal protection of those in the formal sector, use of 
social services, etc. Moreover we assume that this benefit is increasing in individual 
ability, i.e., higher individual productivity is related to larger benefits from better 
institutions. However, being in the formal sector has the additional cost of having to 
pay taxes te.  
On the other hand, workers in the informal sector avoid tax payments but also 
do not enjoy the benefits of being formal. The above can be summarized by assuming 
the utility of a non evading workers as: 
 nej j e ju t e gθ θ= − + +  (3) 
and the utility of a tax evading one as: 
 ej ju gθ= +  (4) 
By comparing (3) and (4), a worker will choose informality and tax evasion when  
 ej
t
e
θ <  (5) 
 According to (5), individuals with intermediate level of income, i.e., 
intermediate skilled workers, choose to evade the payment of taxes. Tax evading 
individuals then are in the middle of the income distribution, as taxes are borne only 
by low skilled (bottom of the income distribution) and high skilled workers. This 
pattern of tax evasion assumed here is consistent with systematic evidence that show 
that tax evasion is more pronounced for the middle of the income distribution (e.g., 
see Tedds, 2010; Fiorio and D’ Amuri, 2005).  
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As θj varies randomly across individuals there exists a value of θj denoted as θˆ , 
for which the individual is indifferent between evading taxes and declaring his 
income, which is given by  
 ˆ et
e
θ =  (6) 
Then using the probability distribution function of the uniform distribution Ω(θ) 
and the definition of θˆ , the total number of legal firms are: 
 
 1
ˆ
1(1 ) ( ) (1 ) 1
2
etb d b
e
ψ
θ θ θ ψψ
+ ⎛ ⎞− Ω = − + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫  (7) 
 
2.1.3 National government’s budget constraint 
The government levies taxes tw on low skilled and te on high skilled worker’s 
income in order to finance the provision of a public good g, the quantity of which 
which is assumed to be exogenous. Government operates under the following 
balanced budget rule: 
 
 
1
ˆ
(1 ) ( )w s eg t bL t b d
ψ
θ θ θ
+= + − Ω∫  (8) 
 
Substituting (2) and (7) into (8) we get the following government’s budget 
constraint:7  
 1( ) 1
2
e
w w e
tbg b w t t t
e
ψψ
− ⎛ ⎞= − + + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (9) 
 
2.1.4 Sub-game equilibrium (for given tax policy and quality of institutions) 
                                                 
7 In order to guarantee that our model has a well defined real solution we assume that 28g bw< (see 
Equation (13) for e=0) 
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Sub-game equilibrium is summarized by equations (2), (6), (7) and (9). In this 
equilibrium: (i) all private agents maximize utility; (ii) all constraints are satisfied; 
(iii) all markets clear. This is for given tax rates tw and te and quality of institutions e.  
 
2.2 Determination of national tax policies 
National tax rates tw and te can be determined in two alternative political 
regimes: an oligarchic regime, where only the rich has voting rights, and a democratic 
one, where all individuals have equal voting rights. We examine equilibrium policy in 
turns in each alternative political regime.   
 
2.2.1 Optimal Taxation in the case of a fully representative democracy  
In a democratic setting we assume that the tax rates τw and τe are determined 
through a probabilistic voting mechanism.8 Assume that there are two political parties 
A and B, each one proposing a policy vector T=(tw, te). The utility gain of a voter if 
party A wins the election instead of party B is u[twA, teA, g]- u[twB, teB, g]. Instead of 
assuming that agents vote for each party with probability one each time this difference 
is positive (as in the median voter model), probabilistic voting theory supposes that 
this vote is uncertain. More precisely, the probability that a person votes for party A is 
given by F(u[twA, teA, g]- u[twB, teB, g]) where F is an increasing and differentiable 
cumulative distribution function. 9   
Since the vote share of each party varies continuously with the proposed policy 
platform, probabilistic voting leads to smooth aggregation of all voters’ preferences, 
                                                 
8 From (3) and (4), the ranking of true utilities may not correspond to the ranking of after tax utilities, 
as there is the possibility of tax evasion (Brock, 2009; Traxler, 2009). Moreover the tax choice is two- 
dimensional. For these reasons we assume that tax choices are made though probabilistic voting. De la 
Croix and Doepke (2009) also apply probabilistic voting in order to tackle a similar problem of non- 
single peaked/ crossing preferences. 
9 The idea behind probabilistic voting is that voters care about non- observable variables to the policy 
choices, like ideology, voter turnout, character of the candidates, influence of campaign advertising etc. 
(see Coughlin, 1992; Hinich and Munger, 1997, p.171- 177). 
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instead of depending solely on the preferences of the median voter. Party A  
maximizes its expected vote share given the expected vote share of party B. Party B 
acts symmetrically, and in equilibrium we have tw=twA=twB, te=teA=teB. The 
maximization problem of each party implements the maximization of the following 
weighted social welfare function10: 
 
 
( )
ˆ 1
ˆ0
ˆ 1
ˆ1
1 1( )
2 2
(1 )1 1                            (1 )
2 2
w
j j e
w t g d b gd
g e t g
W b
b d d
ϕ
ϕ
θ ψ
ψ θ
ϕ ϕ ϕ
θ θθ θψ ψ
+
−
− − + + +
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤+ + − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
=
+ − +
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
 (10) 
subject to the government budget constraint (9). Solving the above expression we get:  
 
2 2
2 2 21( ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 2 1
4 4
e e e
w e
t t tb bW w t e t g
e e e
ψ ψ ψψ
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤− ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − + − − + + + − + − − +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 (11)
  
A fully representative democracy is characterized by extensive voting rights for all 
types of agents (i.e. low skilled workers and high skilled) and consequently equal 
political power for all. In this case tw  and  te are chosen to maximize  (11) subject to 
(9). In doing so, the quality of institutions e is taken as given. As Appendix A1 
explains by dividing the two first order conditions of the optimization problem gives: 
 
 (1 )
D
e
D
w
t e
t w
ψ+=  (12) 
 
Equation (12) implies that higher e (i.e. better quality of institutions) results into 
stronger redistribution from rich (high skilled workers) to poor (low skilled workers) 
                                                 
10 Probabilistic voting then, by assuming that each party seeks to its expected vote share given the 
expected vote share of the other party, is equivalent to maximization of a weighted Benthamite social 
welfare function (Ledyard, 1984; Coughlin, 1986; Mueller, 2003, p. 253- 259). 
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via relatively higher taxes. This is because better institutions imply a higher cost for 
tax evasion and thus the government can easier redistribute from skilled to unskilled 
workers. We consider this to be the redistributive effect of the institutional quality. By 
combining (12) with the government budget constraint (9) we get take the following 
solution for the tax rates: 
 
 
1/ 2
2
(1 ) 81 1
2 (1 )(1 )
D
e
e gt
b w b e
ψ ψ
ψ ψ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞+= − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟+ − +⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 (13) 
 
1/ 2
2
81 1
2 (1 )(1 )
D
w
w gt
b w b e
ψ
ψ ψ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟+ − +⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 (14) 
 
 
Equation (13)  implies that better quality of institutions (i.e., a higher e) generate 
two opposing effects on te. Firstly, there is the redistribution effect highlighted above- 
that leads to higher te. On the other hand, better institutions also imply direct effects 
on the revenue raising ability of the government- the tax base effect. As can be easily 
verified from the government budget constraint (9) an increase in e directly increases 
government revenues by increasing the number of non-evading individuals. This latter 
effect creates a negative effect of e on te.  
 On the other hand, equation (14) implies that the effect of increasing e on tw is 
always negative: better institutional quality results into lower labor taxation because 
in this case there is solely the tax base effect. 
 
2.2.2 Optimal Taxation when voting rights are restricted to the richer subgroup of the 
population (oligarchy) 
When the voting rights are restricted to the richer sub-group of total population (i.e. 
skilled workers) tw  and  te are chosen to maximize (11) subject to (9) where b=0. In 
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doing so, the quality of institutions e is taken as given.11 The solution of the 
optimization problem gives a corner solution where all taxes are borne only by 
unskilled workers, i.e., 
 
1 2
21 4
2
O
w
gt w w
b
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (15) 
 
0Oet =  (16) 
 
Equations  (15) and (16)  imply that when voting rights are restricted to the 
skilled workers, tax policy is chosen so as to maximize the utility of this part of the 
population and not of the majority. Therefore, optimal te is equal to zero and the 
provision of public good is financed solely through labor income taxation te.  
 
The comparison between the two regimes can be summarized by the following 
proposition:  
 
Proposition 1: Given the quantity of the public good g and the quality of the 
institutions e: (i) D Oe et t>  and D Ow wt t<  since in the case of universal suffrage there is a 
redistribution effect that exert a positive effect on entrepreneurial income tax rate and 
negative effect on labor income tax rate. (ii) Ceteris paribus the redistribution effect 
deteriorates with the quality of the institutions e. 
 
                                                 
11 Since individuals pay per unit taxes (i.e. tax payments do not depend on income, but only vary 
between groups) there is no distributional conflict within the elite about the structure of taxation, 
therefore all elite members vote alike, and there is no need to define in more detail the way in which 
decisions are made when elite holds all the political power. 
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2.3 Determination of institutional quality 
We now turn to the first stage of the game, in which the political elite, decides 
optimally the quality of the institutions e in order to maximize the utility of its own 
members. Following the rationale of the relevant literature (see, for example, 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000b; Lizzeri and Persico, 2004; Acemoglu, 2006) we 
define the political elite to be those individuals with the highest income (i.e. the top 
skilled workers). The political elite decide the quality of institutions by taking into 
account the previous stages of the game. 
 Since the political regime is uncertain when e is chosen, the elite maximize 
the expected indirect utility under the two alternative states:  
 (1 ) ( ) ( )O De eV u t u tσ σ= − +  (17) 
where V denotes the expected indirect utility of the decisive elite member. We define 
this individual to have ability θ . Substituting (3), (13), (16)  into (17), yields:  
 (1 )(1 ) ( )
2
eV e g eψθ σ += + + − Δ  (18) 
where  
1/2
2
8( ) 1 1
(1 )(1 )
ge
b w b e
ψ
ψ ψ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞Δ ≡ − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟+ − +⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 
 
Maximizing (18) with respect to e we get: 
1 ( )( ) 1
2 ( )
e ee
e e
ψθ σ ⎡ ⎤+ ∂Δ= Δ +⎢ ⎥Δ ∂⎣ ⎦  (19) 
with  
1/2
22 2
1 8 8 (1 )(1 )1
2 (1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )
g g b
e b w b e b w b e
ψ ψ ψ
ψ ψ ψ ψ
−⎛ ⎞∂Δ − += − −⎜ ⎟∂ + − + ⎡ ⎤⎝ ⎠ + − +⎣ ⎦
 
 
Equation (19) states that in equilibrium the marginal benefit of e (the left hand side of 
(19)) equals the marginal cost of e (the right hand side of (19)). In our model, the 
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marginal benefit from better institutions consists of the positive effect of better 
institutions on productivity-see Equation (3). On the other hand, the marginal cost is 
the redistribution effect minus the increase in government revenues that come as a 
result of reducing tax evasion (i.e., the tax base effect).  
If the tax base effect dominates the redistribution effect, clearly equation (19) 
cannot be satisfied with equality, and the constraint of 1e ≤ implies that the 
equilibrium value of e will be 1. On the other hand, if the redistribution effect 
dominates the tax revenue effect the maximization problem will have an internal 
optimum.12 
From (19) one can easily derive the effect of a higher probability of democracy 
σ on the quality of institutions. This is summarized in the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 2: In equilibrium, the quality of institutions is lower and the size of the 
informal sector is larger the higher the value of σ.  
 
A higher σ, i.e., higher probability of democracy, increases the marginal cost of 
good institutions (the left hand side of (19)). As the marginal benefit does not depend 
on σ, this results into a lower equilibrium value of e. Intuitively, when tax policies are 
chosen subject to universal suffrage there is a redistribution effect that leads to higher 
tax burden on high skilled income. Since, this redistribution effect is decreasing in the 
quality of institutions the political elite finds it optimal to choose a relatively lower 
quality of institutions so as to mitigate the tax burden fallen on high skilled income. 
On the other hand, when tax policies are chosen under restricted voting rights (i.e., the 
                                                 
12 As this is the most interesting case throughout the rest of the paper we will assume that the 
redistribution effect dominates the tax revenue effect. The above discussion can also highlight the main 
contribution of the paper: it introduces a redistribution effect of democracy which depends on the 
quality of institutions. If this effect is small (relative to the positive tax revenue effect), qualitatively it 
is the same as assuming it to be zero. 
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poor are excluded from voting), the redistribution effect does not hold and therefore 
the political elite finds it optimal to decide the highest possible quality of institutions.  
Given the effect of σ on e, the effect of σ on θˆ  and consequently on the size of the 
informal sector is directly determined by equation (6) and (7).  
It must be emphasized that in our model the political elite chooses low 
institutional quality although its members lose in terms of productivity and at the 
same time they do not evade taxes.13 However it chooses a low level of e in order to 
place a constraint to the government, in the form of an informal sector, which limits 
the degree of redistribution. In other words, inefficient institutions in our model arise 
due to a commitment problem: the democratic government cannot commit to a low 
level of redistribution and the political elite correct this by setting a low e.  
 
2.4 Extensions and Discussion 
The previous section illustrated how extended suffrage may lead to highly 
distributive policies which in turns do not facilitate the creation of good institutions. 
In this section we will try to discuss some implications of the basic model.  
In our setting, bad institutions is the “cost” that the elite has to incur in order to 
limit the power of the poor to redistribute income in their favor in a democracy. So far 
we have assumed that the probability of having democracy, σ, is exogenous. 
However, a large growing, literature starting from Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b) 
shows that political regimes and polity transitions are endogenous to the economic 
policy. A central feature of this literature is that the higher the distance between 
democratic and oligarchic policies, the more likely it is that a revolution will take 
place that will impose democracy. Following this rationale we can easily assume that 
                                                 
13 In equation (18) we have implicitly assumed that ˆθ θ> . Had we defined the political elite to be on 
the tax evading group (i.e., ˆθ θ< ) our result would be rather trivial: the elite would choose low e in 
order to evade taxes.  
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σ depends on the difference between Owt and 
D
wt : if unskilled workers expect to pay 
very high taxes in an oligarchy they will revolt and establish a democratic 
government. To simplify things we assume that the probability of a successful revolt 
is determined by  
 ( )2( ) O Dw we t tσ β= −  
where 0<β<1 is a positive constant, which summarizes the response of differences on 
the tax rates of workers between democracy and oligarchy on the probability of a 
transition to democracy. A higher value of β implies that the poor are very sensitive to 
deviations from the tax rate they would pay under democracy, and thus very willing to 
organize, revolt and replace the oligarchic regime. As a consequence, a ceteris paribus 
increase in β implies higher probability of a democratic transition. Also note that from 
Proposition 1, O Dw wt t> . 
The structure of the game is as follows: firstly, the elite determine the quality of 
institutions. Then the poor decide whether they will revolt against the elite and 
establish democracy. Consequently, the government (oligarchic or democratic) sets 
the tax rates. Finally all economic decisions are made. 14 
With these assumptions the structure of the model presented before remains 
unchanged, with the only exception being the indirect utility of the elite at the first 
stage of the game which now is  
 ( )2 (1 )(1 ) ( )2O Dw wV e g t t e eψθ β += + + − − Δ  (20) 
Maximizing with respect to e yields the first order condition 
                                                 
14 Given the timing of events the elite does not have an incentive to use the tax rate on workers in order 
to reduce the probability of a regime transition. 
 18
 
2 1 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 1
2 2 ( )( )
2
O
w
O
w
w we e e et e e
w e e et e
ψθ β
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎛ ⎞+ ∂Δ ∂Δ⎛ ⎞ ⎢ ⎥= − Δ Δ − + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ∂ Δ ∂⎛ ⎞⎝ ⎠ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠− Δ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
   (21) 
 
A simple comparison of equations (21) and (19), shows that the marginal cost of 
e has one additional term (i.e. the first term inside the square brackets). We can call 
this political replacement effect (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006): an increase in e 
reduces the tax rate in the democracy and thus increases the difference between Owt and 
D
wt , increasing the probability of replacement of the elite by a democratic government. 
Therefore when σ is assumed to be endogenous, equilibrium e is lower, than in the 
case of an exogenous σ. Moreover an increase in β, i.e., when individuals are more 
sensitive to deviations from the democratic tax rate and hence there is a high 
probability of a democratic transition, results, as in the previous section, to a lower 
equilibrium e. Therefore we can conclude that the result of Proposition 2 still hold in 
the case of an endogenous σ. 
It is then interesting to examine what happens if the quality of institutions is 
chosen by the unskilled. To our knowledge, in all countries, the initial political power 
rested in the hands of a rich elite rather than to the hands of the poor workers. 
Therefore this latter assumption is far from realistic. However, it interesting to 
examine its consequences from a theoretical point of view. In this case, the result of 
the previous section is reversed: good institutions are the outcome when extended 
suffrage is expected to persist, and bad institutions is the outcome when political 
power is expected to shift towards the rich.15 In this respect, what is crucial in our 
model is the expected duration of political power at the stage of institution building. If 
                                                 
15 If the workers also set policy in an oligarchy, then the results of the previous section still hold. 
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the political power of the elite is transitory, then bad institutions will be chosen in 
order to avoid expropriation by those that will gain power and set government policy.    
The above findings rest on the idea that democratic institutions may also lead to 
extreme redistribution and expropriation of the rich by the poor and thus there is no 
incentive for the rich to invest in good institutions. Thus, in the presence of universal 
suffrage we have a clear commitment problem: if the poor workers could commit that 
they would not exercise their political power and vote for high taxation, the rich elite 
would create a sound institutional environment. This analysis suggests that bad 
institutions are a way for the elite to block extreme redistribution in favor of those that 
will come to hold the political power in the future. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
In this section we empirically examine the main implications of our theoretical model; 
namely, the effect of early democratization on the quality of institutions and the 
corresponding degree of tax evasion within an economy. More precisely, we 
investigate whether the degree of democracy (i) in the first 5-years and (ii) in the first 
10-years after the year of independence of a state, is positively correlated to the size 
of the shadow economy as suggested by our theoretical model. To this end, we 
proceed by estimating the following econometric model employing the data described 
in detail in the next subsection. 
 
3.1 Data and Empirical Methodology 
The empirical model used to study the relation between the informal economy and 
the political regime type in the first years after the year of independence is as follows,  
 
0 1_ _  i i k i i iShadow econ early democr controls geographical dummies uα β β= + + + +      (22) 
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where Shadow_econ in country i is the dependent variable and represents the size of 
the informal sector. Based on the theoretical model, our key explanatory variable is 
early_democr in country i, which represents the extent of the voting rights and the 
corresponding degree of political competition in the first years after the year of 
independence of a state.16 Finally, we employ the core of controls employed by 
Chong and Gradstein (2007) as determinants of informality, geographical dummies 
and a stochastic term ui. We build a cross section dataset of 117 –developed and 
developing- countries. The dependent and explanatory variables are discussed below. 
Explicit definitions, descriptive statistics and sources for the variables employed are 
provided in Appendix B.   
To estimate Eq. (1) we employ as dependent variable the shadow economy 
measure developed by Schneider et al. (2010) (denoted as Shadow_econ). 
Shadow_econ measures the size of the informal economy as a share of GDP and –in 
our sample -ranges from a minimum value of 8.6 (in the case of Switzerland) to a 
maximum of 68.1 (in the case of Bolivia). According to Schneider et al. (2010) 
shadow economy includes all market-based legal production of goods and services 
that are deliberately concealed from public authorities in order to avoid: 1) payment 
of income, value added or other taxes, 2) payment of social security contributions and 
3) having to meet certain legal labor market standards. 
In order to obtain a measure for the extent of the voting rights and the 
corresponding degree of political competition in the first years after the year of 
independence of a state, we construct two alternative variables (denoted as 
early_democr_5 and early_democr_10). The primary source for both of these 
variables is the “competitiveness of participation” index of the Polity IV Project 
                                                 
16 See below for more details on this.  
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database which measures “the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and 
leadership can be pursued in the political arena”.17 Early_democr_5 is constructed in 
order to reflect the “competitiveness of participation” in the first five years after the 
year of independence of a state whereas early_democr_10 measures the 
“competitiveness of participation” in the first ten years after the year of independence. 
Therefore, countries that were characterized by relatively stable political groups, 
which regularly were competing for political influence in the first years after the year 
of national independence, obtain higher values in both these variables, whereas 
countries that were characterized by despotic monarchies and totalitarian party 
systems in their first years obtain relatively lower values.  
To ensure robust econometric identification, we use a number of control variables 
in the estimated equations. Following the rationale of the relevant literature (see, e.g., 
Friedman et al., 2000; Chong and Gradstein, 2007), we employ a set of controls 
similar to that employed by Chong and Gradstein (2007) as determinants of shadow 
economy. More precisely, we control for the overall level of productivity and wealth 
in the economy by employing the log of real GDP per capita over the period 1990-
2004 (denoted as gdppercap); the average annual growth rate over the period 1990-
2004 (denoted as growth); the Deininger and Squire (1997) Gini coefficient over the 
period 1990-2004 (denoted as DS_Gini) and the international market openness 
(denoted as openness) over the same time period. Data for all these variables are taken 
from the World Development Indicators (WDI) (2011).  
In addition, in some specifications we account for the effect of the political regime 
at the present time by employing the democracy index of Polity IV (denoted as 
democracy); the level market regulation (denoted as mark_regulation) and the legal 
                                                 
17 According the Polity IV Project database definitions, “Competitiveness of participation” is coded on 
a five-category scale with lower values denoting no significant oppositional activity outside the ranks 
of the regime and the ruling party and higher values denoting relatively stable and enduring, secular 
political groups that regularly compete for political influence at the national level. 
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origins of each country (legor_uk). Data for democracy are obtained by Polity IV 
Project database (2010), whereas data for mark_regulation and legor_uk are taken 
from Djankov et al. (2002) and La Porta et al. (1999), respectively. Finally, we 
account for the effect of several socioeconomic pressures at work in a society by 
employing the variable “socioeconomic conditions” of the International Country Risk 
Guide (2009) Database (denoted as socioecon_cond).  
 
3.2 Results 
In the following subsections we discuss the results obtained by working as above. 
These are reported in Tables 1 and 2.  
 
3.3.1 The effect of early democratization on the quality of institutions. Basic Results. 
We start by estimating equation (1) presented in section 3.1, using the data and the 
empirical methodology outlined in the previous section. The results are reported in 
Table 1.  
 
[Table 1, here] 
 
In columns (1) to (5), Table 1, Shadow_econ is regressed on early_democr_5 as 
well as on a set of control variables (i.e. gdppercap, mark_regulation, growth, 
DS_gini socioecon_cond). Note that Table 1 presents t-statistics based on clustered 
standard errors (see, e.g., Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004). As can be easily 
verified, early_democr_5 bears a positive and significant coefficient which remains 
qualitatively intact in all five alternative specifications. This result indicates that 
extensive voting rights and higher degree of political competition in the first five 
years after the year of their independence are positively correlated with larger shares 
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of informal economy at the present time. Moreover the estimated magnitude of the 
effect is not negligible: countries that experienced fully competitive political regimes 
are expected to have 7.5% higher share of shadow economy compared to those which 
experience despotic monarchies and totalitarian party systems at the early stages of 
political development. This finding appears to be in accordance with the implications 
driven by our theoretical model where lower quality of institutions (and consequently 
larger shares of informal economy) serves as a means to mitigate the redistribution 
effect, which is stronger in societies characterized by extensive voting franchise.  
As far as the rest of the explanatory variables are concerned, we observe that 
gdppercap, growth and socioecon_cond enter with negative and highly significant 
coefficients in most of the specifications whereas mark_regulation and DS_gini bear 
in contrast positive and significant ones. Our empirical results appear to be in line 
with previous findings of the relevant empirical literature (see e.g. Friedman et al., 
2000; Straub, 2005; Chong and Gradstein, 2007). Namely, richer countries have 
better-run administrations and consequently lower degrees of tax evasion (see e.g. 
Friedman et al., 2000) whereas economies with heavy market regulation, larger 
inequalities and bad socioeconomic conditions are characterized by larger shares of 
shadow economy (see e.g. Straub, 2005; Chong and Gradstein, 2007). 
In columns (6) to (10), Table 1, Shadow_econ is regressed on early_democr_10 
and on the same set of controls following identical estimation strategy. As can be 
easily verified our results regarding the effect of early_democr_10 remain 
qualitatively identical to those presented in columns (1) to (5). The coefficient on 
early_democr_10 is again positive and significant at a level of 95 percent in most of 
the specifications highlighting the positive impact of extensive voting franchise in the 
first ten years after the years of independence on the size of informal economy. 
Concerning the rest of the controls our results remain qualitatively intact. Specifically, 
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gdppercap and growth enter again with a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient in most of the specifications, whereas mark_regulation and DS_gini bear 
positive and significant coefficients. 
 
3.3.2 The effect of early democratization on the quality of institutions. Sensitivity 
Analysis. 
In Table 2, we inquire into the robustness of our baseline results by investigating 
whether the positive effect of early democratization on the size of informal economy 
survives under alternative estimation strategies and different set of controls. To this 
end, in columns (2) and (8) we re-estimate the equations presented in columns (1) and 
(7) respectively by excluding the geographical dummies from our set of controls.18 
Similarly, in columns (3) and (9) we re-estimate the equations presented in columns 
(1) and (7) respectively by including –in addition- colonial dummies in our set of 
controls so as to take into account the colonial history of each specific country. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Moreover, in columns (4) to (6) and (10) to (12) we extend our set of explanatory 
variables by additionally including the variables legor_uk [columns (4) and (10)], 
democracy [columns (5) and (11)] and Fuel_export, and openness  [columns (6) and 
(12)]. As can be easily verified our empirical findings remain qualitatively intact. 
Early_democr_5 and early_democr_10 enter again with positive and highly 
significant coefficients in most of the specifications whereas our empirical findings 
regarding the rest of the explanatory variables remain similar to those presented in 
Table 1. 
                                                 
18 Note that the estimations presented in columns (1) and (7) of Table 2 are identical to those presented 
to columns (5) and (10) of Table1. 
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4. Conclusions 
The present paper aimed to illuminate the political economy forces that may lead 
to the creation of a sizeable informal sector. Our analysis treats unofficial economy as 
an endogenous outcome that may be produced –under certain political circumstances- 
by distributional conflict between different groups. According to this view, extension 
of voting franchise increases the political power of the relatively poor share of the 
population and this unavoidably leads to increased conflict for redistribution. When 
this conflict takes place before the consolidation of a strong institutional structure, the 
political elite have an incentive to establish low quality institutions which allows them 
to mitigate the tax burden fallen on their income.  
The results of our paper could be related with the literature suggesting that initial 
economic structure affects crucially the potential success or failure of a new 
democracy. For example, Moore (1966) relates the share of smallholders in 
agriculture or of large bourgeoisie in cities at the time of democratization with the 
stability and the effects of the new political regime. Similarly, Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2005) and Persson and Tabellini (2009) interrelate the emergence and the 
success of democratic regime with the initial factor endowments and the initial utility 
that citizens derive from the democracy itself respectively.19 In this respect, our 
results could be seen as a first attempt to examine the effects of the initial political 
conditions and timing of democratization on the size of the informal sector. 
Accordingly the size of the unofficial economy is treated as an endogenous outcome 
of the political economy forces that are determined by these conditions. 
                                                 
19 These results are also consistent with another strand of the literature which interrelate the success of 
the democratic regime with the ability of the candidates (parties) to make credible political 
commitments at the time of democratization (see e.g. Keefer and Vlaicu, 2007; Robinson and Verdier, 
2002; Robinson and Torvik, 2005). Shefter (1994) proceeds in an analytical description of the political 
development in Europe and the United States by examining the initial ability of parties to invest in 
credible commitments and to expand their share of voters in this way. 
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In the empirical Section, we inquire into the validity of our theoretical predictions 
by estimating an empirical model where the dependent variable is the shadow 
economy measure developed by Schneider et al. (2010) and key explanatory variables 
are measures of “early democratization.” After extensive sensitivity analysis across a 
number of different specifications, our empirical findings suggest that the relation 
between “early democratization” and the size of the informal economy is indeed 
positive and statistically significant, thus confirming our theoretical proposition.  
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Table 1:  The effect of early democratization on the quality of institutions. Basic Results. 
 
 
 
Notes: 1). t-statistics are reported below the estimated coefficient. 2). *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%.  3). All presented equations are estimated with 
geographical dummies
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
early_democr_5 1.292** 1.554** 1.505** 1.529** 1.339**      
 (2.106) (2.357) (2.475) (2.459) (2.221)      
early_democr_10      1.013* 1.237* 1.257** 1.325** 1.304** 
      (1.670) (1.930) (2.138) (2.173) (2.181) 
gdppercap -5.996*** -5.476*** -2.844* -3.250** -6.042*** -5.952*** -5.454*** -2.764* -3.182** -6.048*** 
 (-6.758) (-6.409) (-1.947) (-2.393) (-4.109) (-6.673) (-6.319) (-1.880) (-2.323) (-4.115) 
mark_regulation  0.765** 0.561* 0.579* 0.499  0.725** 0.522 0.543* 0.468 
  (2.382) (1.701) (1.747) (1.564)  (2.267) (1.612) (1.677) (1.516) 
socioecon_cond   -2.210*** -1.515** -0.523   -2.260*** -1.545** -0.520 
   (-2.891) (-2.002) (-0.604)   (-2.964) (-2.032) (-0.599) 
growth    -1.106* -1.040    -1.138* -1.087* 
    (-1.812) (-1.621)    (-1.855) (-1.683) 
DS_gini     0.356**     0.367** 
     (2.468)     (2.539) 
Geographical 
Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
obs 117 116 116 116 100 117 116 116 116 100 
R2 0.46 0.49 0.53 0.55 0.63 0.45 0.48 0.53 0.54 0.63 
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Table 2: The effect of early democratization on the quality of institutions. Sensitivity Analysis. 
 
 
Notes: 1). t-statistics are reported below the estimated coefficient. 2). *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%. 3). Equations (2) and (8) are estimated without geographical 
dummies 4). Equations (3) and (9) are estimated by including colonial dummies in the set of explanatory variables.
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
early_democr_5 1.339** 1.459** 1.236* 1.274** 1.250** 1.361**       
 (2.221) (2.432) (1.930) (2.088) (2.049) (2.205)       
early_democr_10       1.304** 1.421** 1.210* 1.226* 1.220** 1.335** 
       (2.181) (2.373) (1.857) (1.979) (2.002) (2.163) 
gdppercap -6.042*** -4.645*** -6.022*** -6.156*** -6.333*** -6.173*** -6.048*** -4.634*** -6.023*** -6.155*** -6.342*** -6.175*** 
 (-4.109) (-4.062) (-3.922) (-4.183) (-3.737) (-4.209) (-4.115) (-4.058) (-3.915) (-4.175) (-3.759) (-4.222) 
mark_regulation 0.499 0.643** 0.432 0.591* 0.433 0.460 0.468 0.613* 0.398 0.555* 0.403 0.424 
 (1.564) (2.038) (1.313) (1.836) (1.311) (1.457) (1.516) (1.979) (1.254) (1.766) (1.261) (1.385) 
growth -1.040 -1.561** -1.026 -1.126* -0.986 -0.968 -1.087* -1.601** -1.065 -1.167* -1.040 -1.007 
 (-1.621) (-2.501) (-1.569) (-1.755) (-1.383) (-1.416) (-1.683) (-2.532) (-1.621) (-1.804) (-1.442) (-1.473) 
DS_gini  0.356** 0.179 0.322** 0.350** 0.328* 0.367** 0.367** 0.192 0.332** 0.362** 0.341** 0.379** 
 (2.468) (1.551) (2.326) (2.408) (1.989) (2.457) (2.539) (1.657) (2.375) (2.479) (2.053) (2.530) 
socioecon_cond -0.523 -0.523 -0.554 -0.488 -0.383 -0.434 -0.520 -0.531 -0.554 -0.486 -0.365 -0.435 
 (-0.604) (-0.597) (-0.617) (-0.564) (-0.419) (-0.481) (-0.599) (-0.602) (-0.614) (-0.559) (-0.398) (-0.482) 
legor_uk    2.245      2.135   
    (0.866)      (0.811)   
democracy     -0.018      -0.016  
     (-0.060)      (-0.053)  
Fuel_export      -0.002      0.001 
      (-0.050)      (0.021) 
openness      -0.017      -0.018 
      (-0.804)      (-0.829) 
Geographical 
Dummies yes no yes yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes 
Colonial Dummies no no yes no no no no no yes no no no 
obs 100 100 100 100 93 100 100 100 100 100 93 100 
R2 0.63 0.60 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.60 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 
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Appendix A 
 
The two first order conditions for the maximization program are: 
 ( ) ( 2 )w ww t w tλ− = −  (A.1) 
and  
 2(1 ) 1e et t
e e
ψ λ ψ⎛ ⎞− + = − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (A.2) 
Then equations (A.1) and (A.2) together with the government budget constraint 
(9) can be used to solve for λ, te, tw.     
Dividing (A.1) by (A.2) we get:  
 
2
(1 ) 2 (1 )
2 (1 ) 2(1 ) 2 (1 ) 2 (1 )
w w
e e
e e e e
w w w w
w t w t
t t
e e
t t t tw t w t w w t t
e e e e
ψ ψ
ψ ψ ψ ψ
− −= ⇔
− + − +
− − + + + = − + − + +
 (Α.3) 
Rearranging terms in (A.3), we get equation (12) in text.  
Equation (Α.3) shows what determines the distribution of the tax burden 
between high-skilled and low-skilled workers, for a given level of g. In other words, it 
highlights the redistributive forces of taxation.  
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Appendix B: Data sources and descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Description 
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. min max Source 
Shadow_econ Shadow Economy as a share of GDP 118 33.28 13.50 8.6 68.1 
Schneider et al. 
(2010) 
 
early_democr_5 
Competitiveness of 
participation in the first five 
years after independence 
117 2.26 1.40 0.00 5.00 
Own calculations 
based on  Polity IV 
Project Database 
(2010) 
early_democr_10 
Competitiveness of 
participation in the first ten 
years after independence 
117 3.41 1.00 1.00 5.00 
Own calculations 
based on  Polity IV 
Project Database 
(2010) 
gdppercap Logarithm  of GDP per capita 118 7.85 1.59 4.41 10.55 
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators (2011) 
mark_regulation Procedures to start up a business 117 8.74 3.21 1.55 17.7 
Djankov et al 
(2002) 
growth Economic growth 118 3.18 2.11 -3.19 9.72 
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators (2011) 
DS_gini  Deininger and Squire Gini coefficient 101 40.71 10.29 22.65 74.33 
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators (2011) 
socioecon_cond Socioeconomic Conditions 118 5.69 2.46 0.00 11.00 ICRG (2009) 
legor_uk 
Dummy Variable taking the 
value of one if a country use 
British Civil Laws. 
118 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 La Porta et al (1999) 
democracy 
 Democracy Index 109 3.85 6.20 -10 10 
Polity IV Project 
Database (2010) 
Fuel_export 
 
SITC 3(minerals and fuels) 
exports as a % of total 
merchandise exports. 
117 19.91 29.30 0.003 97.35 
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators (2011) 
openness 
 Imports plus Exports (%GDP) 118 63.90 47.28 16.26 397.41 
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators (2011) 
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